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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper aims to contribute new insights to the burgeoning literature on small firm 
internationalisation and international entrepreneurship (IE), and the born global (BG)/ 
international new ventures (INV) phenomenon in particular. It takes an explicitly 
interdisciplinary perspective, building on recent contributions from the BG/INV literature 
(notably network and resource-based perspectives) and infusing insights from the separate 
thematic research stream on ‗clusters‘ within economic geography, regional studies and 
related disciplines
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. The underlying conceptual question explored in the paper is: (How) is the 
emergence and internationalisation behaviour of new ventures (especially the propensity to 
follow a ‘born global' strategy) affected by the cluster life cycle context within which they are 
founded? This question is explored using a revelatory, longitudinal and historical case study 
of Ireland's indigenous software cluster. Within the case study, particular attention is focused 
on the creation and internationalisation of eight ‗true born global‘ software firms (i.e. 
embedded units of analysis). A notable feature of the paper is that the investigation of these 
born global firms is - in contrast to many previous studies - fully contextualised within an 
account of the wider cluster‘s emergence and evolution over a period of two decades. 
 
The case study findings draw attention to the pivotal importance of the specific geographic 
and historical context within which the studied born global software firms were created then 
internationalised. The eight firms studied were founded in the late 1990s, when the Irish 
software industry was in the expansionary/established stage of its cluster life cycle. By this 
time, the regional entrepreneurial environment in Ireland was significantly more supportive 
than that which prevailed in earlier years, and some of the resources that are known to be 
useful for early and rapid internationalisation (e.g. venture capital, experienced executives and 
supportive institutions) were relatively abundant. In addition, the studied BG firms had 
superior resources and capabilities at inception, by comparison with firms founded in earlier 
stages of the cluster life cycle, due to the extensive prior experiences of their founding team 
members, acquired during earlier phases of the cluster life cycle.  
 
The case study suggests that the emergence of a certain type of ‗truly born global‘ firm may 
be specific to particular places and periods in time, and predicated upon a rather unusual 
convergence of favourable circumstances – as was apparently the case in Ireland in the late 
1990s/early 2000s. In terms of wider implications for the literature on internationalisation, the 
case study suggests that the context for new venture creation (both geographically and 
historically) may matter to a greater extent than is commonly acknowledged in the IB and IE 
literature, and should perhaps be given greater attention in future studies. The paper also 
illustrates the potential ‗added value‘ of an interdisciplinary perspective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The internationalisation of firms - including new and small firms - has been a longstanding 
concern of researchers in international business and beyond (Coviello and McAuley 1999; 
Ruzzier et al. 2006). This topic has been given new life over the last decade by the 
burgeoning literature on so-called ‗born global‘ (BG) firms or international new ventures 
(INV) and is now seen as a key research theme in a wider sub-discipline of ‗international 
entrepreneurship‘ (IE) that straddles IB, entrepreneurship, marketing and strategic 
management (Rialp et al. 2005; Aspelund et al. 2007; Keupp and Gassmann 2009). However, 
one slightly surprising feature of this literature, and indeed the wider literature in business and 
management studies, is the paucity of attention given to geography; for example, whether 
BG/INVs are more likely to emerge in certain regions/countries or how the home 
region/country environment might influence their emergence and subsequent performance. A 
small number of recent BG/INV studies (e.g. Zuchella et al. 2007; Al-Laham and Souitaris 
2008; Fernhaber et al. 2008), along with some contributions to the general business and 
management literature (e.g. Tallman et al. 2004; Gilbert et al. 2006), suggest that a more 
‗geographically-aware‘ perspective, drawing on insights from economic geography and 
related ‗spatial‘ disciplines, might add some value to existing understandings. 
 
Hence this paper seeks to bring new insights to the study of new venture internationalisation 
by adopting an explicitly interdisciplinary approach. Specifically, it seeks to build on recent 
contributions from the BG/INV literature (notably network and resource-based perspectives) 
by drawing on key insights from the thematic research stream on ‗clusters‘ within the 
disciplines of economic geography, regional studies and industrial dynamics. The underlying 
conceptual question explored in the paper is: 
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(How) is the emergence and internationalisation behaviour of new ventures 
(especially the propensity to follow a ‘born global' strategy) affected by the cluster life 
cycle context within which they are founded? 
This question is explored using revelatory, longitudinal and historical case study of Ireland‘s 
indigenous software cluster. Within the case study, particular attention is focused on the 
creation and internationalisation of eight ‗true born global‘ software firms (i.e. embedded 
units of analysis). Investigation of these born global firms is contextualised within an account 
of the wider cluster‘s emergence and evolution over a period of two decades. The choice of 
the Irish software case was based on three factors. First, Ireland has gained international 
recognition as an emerging software development ‗hotspot‘ in the technical academic 
literature (Cochran 2001; Cusumano 2005) and in the literature on technology clusters, 
entrepreneurship and economic development (Bresnahan et al. 2004; Arora and Gambardella 
2005; Roche et al. 2008). Second, studies of software firms have been prominent in the 
burgeoning literature on the BG/INV phenomenon (e.g. Bell 1995; Coviello and Munro 1997; 
Moen et al. 2004; Ojala 2009), which has been most frequently (but not exclusively) 
associated with small knowledge-intensive firms in high tech sectors. Third, the author‘s 
familiarity with this regional industry cluster from previous projects suggested it had qualities 
that would make a good ‗revelatory‘ case on the topic in question (Yin 2009, p.48-9). 
 
The case study findings draw attention to the pivotal importance of the specific geographic 
and historical context within which the studied born global software firms were created then 
internationalised. The eight firms were founded in the late 1990s, when the Irish software 
industry was in the expansionary/established stage of its cluster life cycle. By this time, the 
regional entrepreneurial environment in Ireland was significantly different from that which 
prevailed in earlier years, having ‗co-evolved‘ alongside successive waves of new venture 
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creation, most notably during the 1990s. As a result, some of the resources that are known to 
be useful for early and rapid internationalisation (e.g. venture capital, experienced executives 
and supportive institutions) were relatively abundant. In addition, the studied BG firms had 
superior resources and capabilities at inception, by comparison with firms founded in earlier 
stages of the cluster life cycle, due to the extensive prior experiences of their founding team 
members, acquired during earlier phases of the cluster life cycle. This meant these firms were 
particularly well-placed to capitalise on the increasingly ‗munificent‘ entrepreneurial 
environment in Ireland in the late 1990s/early 2000s, and to exploit emerging niche 
opportunities in global software markets. Hence, their internationalisation was generally 
earlier, more rapid, more ‗aggressive‘, more multi-modal and wider in geographic scope 
compared to firms founded during earlier stages in the cluster life cycle.  
 
This specific case study suggests that the emergence of ‗truly born global‘ firms may be 
specific to certain places and periods in time, and predicated upon a rather particular (possibly 
unusual) convergence of favourable circumstances. In terms of wider implications, the case 
study suggests that the context for new venture creation and internationalisation (both 
geographically and historically) may matter to a greater extent than is commonly 
acknowledged in the IB and IE literature, and should be given greater attention in future 
studies. The paper also illustrates the potential ‗added value‘ of an interdisciplinary 
perspective. In the specific case examined here, insights from economic geography, regional 
studies and industrial dynamics proved useful in shedding new light on the BG/INV 
phenomenon. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews key contributions from the 
(largely disconnected) thematic literatures on new venture internationalisation and clusters, 
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and makes the case for an interdisciplinary approach to the BG/INV phenomenon. The case 
study method and data sources are then explained. The fourth section of the paper presents the 
case study evidence on new venture creation and internationalisation and the cluster life cycle 
in Ireland‘s indigenous software industry, with a particular focus on the eight born global 
firms. Some conclusions, limitations and issues for further research are then outlined. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: NEW VENTURE INTERNATIONALISATION AND 
CLUSTERS 
 
New venture internationalisation: a selective review 
Table 1 briefly summarises some of the key questions addressed in BG/INV literature, and 
some of the key theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches to this topic. A 
number of recent articles provide wide-ranging reviews of the burgeoning literature on 
BGs/INVs (Rialp, Rialp, and Knight 2005; Aspelund, Madsen, and Moen 2007; Keupp and 
Gassmann 2009). For this reason, and due to space constraints, this part of the review is 
limited to a handful of key points.  
 
The first point to note is that new and small firms are typically faced with a number of 
significant challenges and barriers to international expansion, particularly by comparison with 
larger and more established firms; these are sometime be described as the liabilities of 
newness, smallness and foreignness. In the resource-based view (RBV), new and small firms 
are often portrayed as resource deficient. Following this RBV reasoning, studies of new and 
small firm internationalisation have sought to distinguish between non-exporters and 
exporters on the basis of resource endowments (Westhead et al. 2001). Within the BG/INV 
literature, the resource-based view has also become popular theoretical perspective in both 
6 
empirical and conceptual studies, along with the closely related knowledge-based view 
(KBV) (e.g. Coviello and Cox 2006; Gassmann and Keupp 2007; Gabrielsson et al. 2008; 
Casillas et al. 2009). RBV-based empirical studies of BG/INVs have paid a lot of attention to 
their founders/TMT, since the most of principal resources (and capabilities) of these firms at 
start-up are likely to be ‗embodied‘ in these key individuals (Gabrielsson et al. 2008). These 
resources may include, for example: technological and marketing knowledge; leadership and 
managerial capabilities; and social and business network ties (‗relational‘ resources). As noted 
earlier, these resources have often been accumulated and developed during prior international 
work experience (Bloodgood et al. 1996; Belso-Martinez 2006; Zucchella et al. 2007).  
 
The role of networks is a recurrent theme in studies of BG/INVs. Coviello and Cox (2006, 
117) have observed that ―networks both generate resources and are a resource in their own 
right‖. Several recent studies grounded in the RBV have highlighted the way in which 
BG/INVs acquire crucial resources for early internationalization from external network actors 
(e.g. Laanti, Gabrielsson, and Gabrielsson 2007). BG/INV founders have also been shown to 
use their existing networks, and to develop new networks, in order to leverage the additional 
resources required for early internationalization from outside the firm (Loane and Bell 2006; 
Loane, Bell, and McNaughton 2007). A key resource category considered in many recent 
empirical studies of BG/INVs is finance. Early and rapid internationalization is said to require 
significant financial investments, for example to fund new product development and 
international marketing efforts. Thus, for some BG/INVs, venture capital investment has been 
found to be a vital resource, as a source of significant ‗up front‘ financial resources but also as 
a provider of additional knowledge and network ties (Gabrielsson, Sasi, and Darling 2004; 
Fernhaber and McDougall-Covin 2009). 
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Several recent RBV or KBV-based studies, have de-limited different ‗phases‘ in the life cycle 
of the BG/INV. These phases appear to have different resource acquisition and utilisation 
patterns. Thus, Coviello and Cox (2006) distinguish between the conception, 
commercialization and growth stages and show how ‗resource flows‘ within three New 
Zealand INVs vary across these stages. Similarly, Gabrielsson et al. (2008) suggest born 
globals pass through three phases (an introduction and initial launch phase; a growth and 
resource accumulation phase; and a break-out phase where the BG evolves into a ‗normal‘ 
MNE) and propose that the resources and networks of the BG develop across these phases. A 
final interesting point of note comes from Coviello and Cox (2006). Although much of the 
RBV-inspired BG/INV literature focuses on resource acquisition, these authors have observed 
that such firms are also able to use certain types of external resource without actually 
assuming ownership of them (thereby minimising cost and risk); for example, using channel 
partners and distributors to reach overseas customers. They dub this scenario a ‗resource 
mobilization flow‘ to distinguish it from the more conventional ‗resource acquisition flow‘. 
 
Whilst impressive strides have been made in the BG/INV and IE research fields over recent 
years, the literature could perhaps be criticised – at least from an interdisciplinary standpoint - 
for an overly narrow focus on the firm and entrepreneur as units of analysis and a lack of 
attention to the geographical (and historical) context for new venture internationalisation
2
. In 
fact, until very recently the vast majority of BG/INV studies have paid scant attention to the 
geographical context (e.g. type of regional environment) within these firm emerge or how this 
home region/country context might influence their emergence and performance. It is here that 
this paper seeks to contribute, starting with a review of potentially relevant insights from the 
distinct thematic research stream on clusters. 
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Key insights from the clusters literature 
Research on industry clusters has been one of the hottest topics in the social sciences in recent 
decades and spans several academic disciplines including economic geography, regional 
studies, regional science, applied and regional economics, and industrial dynamics. According 
to the most widely cited definition, a cluster is a geographic concentration of interconnected 
businesses, specialized suppliers, and associated institutions in a particular field (Porter 1998). 
Some of the key research questions, research strategies and methodologies and theoretical 
perspectives in the clusters research stream are summarised in Table 1. The discussion here 
focuses first on cluster advantages, then on more work on cluster emergence evolution and 
life cycles. 
 
Cluster advantages  
Porter‘s (1998) ideas on clustering (e.g. diamond model) are perhaps most familiar to 
business and management scholars but this work has been subject to harsh criticism from 
leading economic geographers (Martin and Sunley 2003) and shown to have limitations in 
explaining the existence of some emergent technology clusters (O‘Gorman et al. 1997; Nair et 
al. 2007). Economic geographers‘ views on industry clusters traditionally drew heavily on 
Alfred Marshall‘s (1890) concept of agglomeration economies. Marshall proposed that firms 
would continue to be localised within the same geographic area because of the costs savings 
that result from (1) the development of a local pool of specialised labour, (2) the increased 
local provision of inputs specific to an industry, and (3) the maximum flow of information 
and ideas between proximate firms (Gordon and McCann 2000, p.516).  
 
Some authors suggested that the pure, cost-based agglomeration economies approach had 
limited utility in accounting for the clustering of certain knowledge-intensive industries (e.g. 
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Pinch and Henry 1999; Keeble and Nachum 2002). Hence, more recent work in economic 
geography and regional studies has sought alternative explanations of clustering, focusing on 
knowledge, learning and innovation (thereby extending Marshall‘s ideas on localized 
spillovers of knowledge) – for example, the innovative milieu, learning regions and regional 
innovation systems approaches (e.g. Camagni 1991 and 1995; Keeble et al. 1999; Malmberg 
and Maskell, 2002). These approaches suggest beneficial knowledge dissemination and 
‗collective learning‘ are fostered within clusters via various mechanisms including: flows of 
professionals and ―embodied expertise‖ through the local labour market; high rates of 
localised entrepreneurship and spin-off of new firms from existing businesses, and firm 
failure leading to reconfiguration of staff in new firms; and formal and informal networking, 
including collaboration and personal interaction by professionals and managers of cluster 
firms and observation and gossip in workplace and social settings. 
 
Another area of work that falls under the heading of ‗cluster advantages‘ concerns the idea 
that clusters offer beneficial environments for new venture creation and growth, an idea that 
has also been advanced by Porter (1998). Malecki (2002, 335) observes: ―...regions differ in 
the way they can sustain new businesses …[in terms of] the diverse assortment of information 
and other knowledge necessary for firm formation and business success‖. This point has been 
illustrated in research on successful high technology regions in the United States. For 
example, Feldman‘s (2001) work on the evolution of the biotech industry in the US Capitol 
region identifies a ‗munificent entrepreneurial environment‘ – comprising the availability of 
venture capital, supportive social capital and an ‗entrepreneurial culture‘, and entrepreneurial 
support services, such as intellectual property lawyers and specialist business service firms - 
as a key component in the emergence of new biotech ventures in this place. Similarly, Stuart 
and Sorenson (2003) argued that entrepreneurs in the US biotech industry were attracted to 
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establish their businesses in particular locations that are characterized by a concentration of 
‗critical resources‘ such as highly-skilled labour and venture capital. Similar ideas can be 
found in research on Silicon Valley; for example, Lee et al. (2000) describe the fertile 
entrepreneurial environment or ‗habitat‘ within which Silicon Valley‘s high-tech industries 
grow and flourish. Key elements of this habitat include a supportive business and regulatory 
environment and a wide variety of support firms and consultants whose sole purpose, or a 
significant component of their business, is related to servicing start-ups. 
 
Cluster emergence, evolution and life cycles 
More recent contributions to the clusters literature suggest further useful insights that could be 
– but have not yet – been incorporated into the BG/INV literature. The chief contributions 
reviewed here concern: the fact that clusters evolve through life-cycles; and the role of 
entrepreneurial agency (including spin-offs) in the growth, emergence and evolution of 
clusters
3
. 
 
First, research has highlighted that clusters have their own ‗life cycles‘ and evolve through a 
number of stages (e.g. Brenner and Fornahl 2003; Bergman 2008; Menzel and Fornahl 2010). 
Studies of cluster evolution and of clusters at different stages of their life cycle have 
suggested that the presumed benefits of a cluster location (as discussed above) may be present 
once a cluster is fully established but absent during the early stages of its emergence 
(Bresnahan et al 2001; Feldman 2005), and also that agglomeration economies may fade or 
even reverse when the clusters reach maturity/stagnation (Potter and Watts 2010). 
A second contribution of more recent studies concerns the role of entrepreneurship in 
emergence and transformation of clusters. Several studies have argued that the origin and 
early emergence of clusters is not explained by agglomeration economies or collective 
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learning since these cannot be present without a critical mass of firm (Bresnahan et al. 2001; 
Feldman et al. 2001). Instead, these studies point the key role of entrepreneurial agency – 
notably the efforts of pioneering entrepreneurs - in seeding clusters and driving the cluster 
through phases in its life cycle (Bresnahan et al. 2001; Harrison et al. 2004; Feldman et al. 
2005; Mason 2008). Research from the industrial dynamics tradition is also relevant here, 
since a number of ‗genealogical‘ studies of firm populations have now shown that localised 
spin-offs from incumbent firms are a key mechanism in the growth of clusters (e.g. Klepper, 
2001; Brenner and Fornahl, 2003; Dahl et al, 2003). This spin-off process may become 
reinforcing because most new firms are founded in the same geographical region as the firm 
that ‗produced‘ the entrepreneur (Klepper 2001; Romanelli and Schoonhoven 2001; Dahl, 
Pedersen, and Dalum 2003) and the number of spin-offs in a region is likely to be a function 
of the number and size of incubator organisations (incumbent firms) within the region whose 
fertility is sufficient for the emergence of start-ups (Sternberg and Litzenberger, 2004). 
 
The potential for interdisciplinary insights? 
It is a key contention of this paper that an interdisciplinary perspective has the potential to 
‗add value‘ to the study of IB/IE topics. A second disciplinary perspective can be seen as an 
alternative ‗lens‘ though which to view a phenomenon or problem. It seems that the literature 
on clusters from economic geography, regional studies and related disciplines has much to 
offer here, not least because it addresses a ‗conceptual blindspot‘ in much of the business and 
management literature, which focuses on the firm (or entrepreneur) as its primary unit of 
analysis, thereby tending to neglecting the wider context (Table 1). In contrast, the spatial 
disciplines focus on the country, region, city or place as the primary unit of analysis has led 
similar ‗blind spot‘ with regards to the firm and entrepreneur, which tend to be under-
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theorised and treated as a ‗black box‘. This all suggests the two disciplines have much to offer 
each other, if disciplinary prejudices and miscommunications can be set aside. 
 
Turning specifically to potential insights from the clusters literature, the key lesson from the 
literature on ‗cluster advantages‘ (reviewed above) is that cluster locations may offer a range 
of benefits to a new venture during the start-up and growth phases, including access to 
specialised suppliers and service providers and various useful resources such as venture 
capital and skilled labour. This point has, in fact, recently (and perhaps belatedly) been 
recognised by a handful of authors in the BG/INV literature, leading to the suggestion that 
cluster locations may also be beneficial for new venture internationalisation. For example, Al-
Laham and Souitaris (2008) find that location of new biotech ventures in a local cluster 
already dense with international linkages increases their probability of forming international 
research alliances. Also, Fernhaber et al. (2008) find a cluster location positively influences 
new IT venture internationalization, and firm characteristics impact the nature of this 
relationship. Further research along these lines is required. 
 
However, it seems the BG/INV literature has yet to absorb some of the lessons from the more 
recent literature on ‗cluster emergence, evolution and life cycles‘ (reviewed above). There do 
not yet appear to be any studies that link the internationalisation of firms (or likelihood of 
early internationalisation) to stages of the cluster life cycle. For example, Fernhaber et al.‘s 
(2008) landmark study, which is arguably the best example to date cross-disciplinary 
engagement on the BG/INV topic, takes a static or cross-sectional view of clusters based on 
location quotient measures of geographic concentration. Also, the potential links between new 
venture internationalisation and venture origin types requires further exploration; notably the 
role played by spin-offs and other ‗geographically path dependent‘ venture origin types in the 
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BG/INV phenomenon. The potential for uncovering new insights from a closer examination 
of venture origins and ‗hidden ties‘ is well illustrated by recent studies highlighting the links 
between portfolio and serial entrepreneurship and the born global phenomenon (McGaughey 
2007; Presutti et al. 2008). 
 
METHOD 
 
Case study design 
The empirical part of the paper is based on a revelatory, longitudinal and historical case study 
of new venture internationalisation within Ireland‘s indigenous software cluster4. A case study 
approach is appropriate because the study sought to examine a contemporary phenomenon 
(new venture internationalisation) within its real-life context (the Irish software cluster). Two 
of Yin‘s (2009, p.48-49) justifications for adopting a single case design are present here: 
revelatory and longitudinal (studying a case over time). Within the case study, multiple 
embedded units of analysis are examined, since particular attention is focused on the creation 
and internationalisation of eight ‗true born global‘ software firms, founded between 1997 and 
2000. 
 
Yin (2009) suggests a revelatory case study is justified when an investigator has access to a 
phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation. In this case, the author‘s prior 
familiarity with the Irish software industry, as part of another project, gave access to data that 
subsequently became useful for a different purpose. Several examples of ‗true born globals‘ 
were identified among the studied firms and in-depth examination of these cases exposed the 
deep roots of these firms in the cluster, and the apparent links between the emergence of these 
firms and the features of the Irish software industry and regional entrepreneurial environment 
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at a particular stage in the cluster life cycle. Thus, the potential relationship between new 
venture internationalisation and the cluster life cycle was viewed as a phenomenon previously 
‗hidden‘ from investigation – or at least not previously exposed - and worthy of wider 
consideration.  
 
The study is historical in nature in that is focuses on past events, going back up to 20 years 
and relies on to some extent on archival sources. The longitudinal dimension (i.e. studying the 
phenomenon over time not just in a static and cross-sectional way) is considered to be 
particularly important here, since the study is interested in new venture creation and 
internationalisation, and the regional entrepreneurial environment, in the Irish indigenous 
software industry through different stages in the cluster life cycle. Note that many existing 
published studies of technology clusters give only a static analysis of the cluster in question 
(i.e. examine it at one only point in time, ignoring the life cycle dimension, or attempting to 
account for the cluster‘s existence based on cross-sectional data). Yin (2009, p.49) notes that 
longitudinal studies can be useful for studying how certain conditions change over time. 
Further the use of chronological analysis, allows events to be traced over time and may 
permit causal inferences to be drawn (Yin, 2009, p.148); this approach was used to construct 
an account of the overall cluster life cycle of the Irish software industry. 
 
Data sources 
The case study is based on in-depth, largely desk-based research using a wide array of 
secondary data sources, supplemented by a close reading of evidence in several existing 
academic studies of the Irish software industry (O‘Gorman et al. 1997; Ó Riain, 1999 and 
2004; O‘Malley and O‘Gorman 2001; Arora et al. 2004; Sands 2005; Roche et al. 2008) and 
one in-depth non-academic account (Sterne 2004)
5
. The aforementioned secondary data 
15 
sources included individual companies‘ web-sites - which contained a range of information in 
the form of press releases, ―about us‖ pages, etc. – and various sector-specific and general on-
line news media and other secondary sources. Among the key sources here were:  
 TIU TechWatch - TIU is a Dublin-based management consultancy which specialises 
in the technology, media and communications [TMT] industries in Ireland. TechWatch 
(www.techwatch.ie) is its sector-specific on-line daily news service;  
 ElectricNews.net – ENN provides a free-access newswire (www.electricnews.net) 
focusing on the Irish IT and telecoms sector; and  
 Irish Emigrant Publications‘ Professional Ireland (www.emigrant.ie) – an Internet-
based news service aimed at the Irish business community worldwide.  
Each of these web-sites has a keyword search facility which allowed the identification of 
news stories pertaining to specific companies. Usefully, several interviews with key figures in 
the industry, including the founder of leading firms, were also published by these outlets. The 
secondary data was originally collected between 2001 and 2003, when the Irish software 
industry was the subject of prolonged and detailed monitoring and observation by the author 
as part of another project, and subsequently re-examined and supplemented at specific points 
in 2004 and 2009. A large, structured data archive was produced as a result of this process. 
Notably, a ‗source file‘ or data array was maintained for each company of interest, comprising 
many of the ‗leading lights‘ of the Irish software industry. Files were also compiled on a 
number of key industry figures, including the founders of influential firms and serial 
entrepreneurs. Additional folders were compiled on thematic topics, such as mergers and 
acquisitions and venture capital. Analysis of these sources was guided by theories and 
concepts from the two thematic parent literatures underpinning the study. 
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Although case study research frequently makes use of secondary sources, the adoption of a 
wholly desk-based approach is unusual in economic and business research, which tends to 
rely on official data series, mail surveys or face-to-face interviews with company executives. 
The approach has some shortcomings but also certain advantages. One of the shortcomings is 
that the available data suffer from a certain lack of consistency (i.e. not all ‗variables‘ are 
available for each company under investigation). The approach also lacks the systematic rigor 
of extensive sample-based survey methods. However, the advantages include: the availability 
of vast amounts of ‗free‘ data which offers much more depth and detail than is available using 
survey methods or interviews; there are no response rate issues (survey fatigue is a growing 
problem in business research); the data can be re-examined if additional questions arise (and 
indeed it was); there are no time constraints, unlike limit face-to-face interviews with busy 
company executives; and, importantly, a longitudinal perspective is facilitated. 
 
Embedded units: the born global cases 
Finally, the process used to identify and examine the eight born global cases should be 
explained. The eight cases were identified from among a wider group (compiled for an earlier 
study) of 26 Irish indigenous software and technology firms that had been founded after 
January 1996 and received at least one round of venture capital funding between January 
1999 and December 2001. The wider group was narrowed down to a long list of firms where 
secondary data was available on key variables of interest (e.g. founder background, key 
customers and markets) and there was sufficient data to construct a rough ―event history‖. 
Firms founded before 1997 were excluded at this stage as there was insufficient information 
about the early post-start-up period of the firm in secondary data. Possible ‗born global‘ 
candidates were then identified from the remaining firms as firms with international 
customers from inception or very soon after start-up. A data availability filter was applied 
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again applied resulting in the number of viable case studies being reduced to eight. For these 
eight firms, a narrative was constructed about the origins and pre-history of the venture; 
information about the key founders and their backgrounds was compiled; and ‗critical 
incident‘ timelines (chronologies) were constructed covering the period from start-up until 
Aug 2004. A second sweep of secondary data sources was conducted in October 2009 to 
update the case stories for the period Sept 2004 to Oct 2009, and to augment earlier data. 
 
All eight of the chosen firms are ‗significant‘ examples of (Irish software) new venture 
internationalisation. All are mentioned as significant ‗Generation 4‘ firms in John Sterne‘s 
(2004) story of the Irish software industry. And all can be considered successful in certain 
terms: e.g. secured high profile international customers; survived the global technology sector 
downturn of 2001-03; traded independently for at least five years (and mostly longer); and 
secured key contracts with major ‗blue chip‘ corporate clients in distant markets and in 
multiple global market regions. As of October 2009, all eight were either still trading 
independently (three firms, including two privately held and one listed on London‘s AIM ) or 
had ‗exited‘ via a trade sale (five firms, including four sold to US firms – at least one of 
which was Nasdaq-listed). Although the selection of cases was not initially based on 
theoretical or representative sampling, the chosen firms do seem to illustrate a range of 
different ‗types‘ in terms of characteristics such as: venture origin, specialism and market 
niche, and ‗outcome‘ (independent going concern or trade sale).  
 
CASE STUDY EVIDENCE: NEW VENTURE CREATION AND 
INTERNATIONALISATION AND THE CLUSTER LIFE CYCLE IN IRELAND’S 
INDIGENOUS SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
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Overview of Ireland‘s indigenous software industry 
 
Ireland has been widely recognised as an example of a late-comer or emergent technology 
region (e.g. Bresnahan et al. 2004; Arora and Gamabrdella 2005; Roche et al. 2008). Other 
widely recognised emergent technology/ICT clusters, albeit of differing scales and with 
different specialities, have been reported in places like Israel, Bangalore (India), Taiwan and 
Finland (e.g. Teubal et al. 2002; Arora et al. 2004; De Fontenay and Carmel 2004; Roper and 
Grimes 2005; Nair et al. 2007). In the Irish case, the development has been characterised by 
significant inward foreign direct investment, notably from the United States, in sectors such 
as ICT hardware manufacturing, software and pharmaceuticals
6
. However, arguably the most 
significant component of the Irish experience is the emergence of a dynamic, entrepreneurial, 
innovative and export-oriented indigenous software industry (O‘Gorman et al. 1997; Ó Riain 
1999 and 2004; Sands 2005; Roche et al. 2008). By 2000, the indigenous industry comprised 
over 700 firms, employed around 14,000 people and generated annual revenues of €1.4 billion 
(Source: National Software Directorate statistics)
7
. During the late 1990s, several of its 
leading firms underwent IPOs on the Nasdaq stock exchange or were acquired by leading 
multinational firms, and some firms were global players within their particular market niches. 
Employment in the industry grew throughout the 1990s but was notably higher (average of 
24% p.a.) in the second half of the 1990s than in the first half of the decade. Total revenue 
grew by nearly 30% p.a. during the 1990s – reaching €1.5 billion per year by 2002-03 - and 
total exports grew even faster (at 37% p.a.) as the indigenous industry became more export 
oriented over the decade (Figure 1); the United States, UK and Continental Europe were all 
significant export markets by the late 1990s. By the late 1990s/early 2000s, leading Irish firms 
were also making acquisitions (outward FDI) in the US, UK and elsewhere (Crone, 2002).  
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By the late 1990s, the dominant activity of Irish indigenous software firms was software 
product development. According to Arora et al (2001) 44% of indigenous software firms were 
involved in the development of software products. HotOrigin (2001, p.5) also identified at 
least 250 local companies engaged directly in the development of software products. This 
product-oriented business model was adopted by the most successful indigenous firms. In 
terms of product/technology focus, the indigenous product development industry at the 21
st
 
century was heavily concentrated on enterprise application integration (including middleware) 
and wireless technologies (applications and infrastructure). Other strong niches in Ireland 
were said to be CRM, e-learning, Java components and XML-based tools (HotOrigin Ltd, 
2001, p.8). In terms of vertical markets, the main target sectors are the financial services 
industry, the telecommunications industry and other high technology industries. The main 
areas of specialisation include: financial services applications/solutions, e-security/secure 
payment solutions, e-learning/computer based training, open systems-based middleware and 
telecommunications software. 
 
The indigenous software industry is entrepreneurial in character, being predominantly 
composed of a large number of small firms. There was a high start-up rate and a low closure 
rate throughout the 1990s (O‘Gorman et al, 1997). In the late 1990s, the rate of new 
indigenous software product company formations increased markedly. For example, survey 
evidence suggested that fewer than 30% of the estimated 250 indigenous software product 
development companies in existence in 2001 were established before 1996, and almost half 
had been established since the beginning of 1999 (HotOrigin, 2001). Mirroring the increase in 
start-up activity through the 1990s was an increase in the number of larger indigenous firms. 
In 1989 there were only 4 indigenous software firms with 50+ employees but this had 
increased to 24 by 1995, 34 by 1998 and at least 60 by 2001 (Crone, 2002).  
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Phases in the cluster life cycle and the co-evolution of entrepreneurial agency and the 
regional environment 
 
In keeping with recent evolutionary accounts of clusters, as discussed earlier, the Irish 
indigenous software industry has clearly gone through a number of ‗life-cycle‘ stages. Table 2 
give an overview of this life cycle in four major phases from the late 1970s to the early 2000s, 
highlighting the key characteristics of both the industry and the regional entrepreneurial 
environment at each stage. This summary has been informed by the author‘s own secondary 
research and reading of existing studies. In particular, Sterne‘s (2004) delimits ‗five 
entrepreneurial generations‘ of Irish software firms in his industry history. However, it is 
contended that these five generations do not necessarily map neatly onto the main phases in 
the cluster life cycle. Also of interest here was Roche et al.‘s (2008) model that depicts four 
phases in the emergence and evolution of Ireland as an entrepreneurial technology region.  
 
The key points to note from the summary in Table 2 are as follows: 
 An identifiable cluster of firms only became evident in the early 1990s but significant 
pioneering software entrepreneurship was talking place in Ireland as early the 1970s 
(Sterne 2004). Some important pre-conditions for future success were ‗accidentally‘ sown 
in the regional environment around this time; 
 The industry‘s specialisation on niche software products for export markets became 
ingrained from the early 1990s onwards and it was only at this stage that the Irish State 
began to establish industry-specific institutions; 
 The industry seems to have reached a kind of critical mass in the mid 1990s, after which 
the rate of new firm formation and employment growth and level of exports accelerated. 
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The Nasdaq IPOs of CBT Systems in 1995 and Iona Technologies in 1997 could be seen 
as key watershed events. 
 By the late 1990s, the region began to resemble an entrepreneurial technology cluster with 
apparently self-reinforcing growth dynamics. At this stage, the Irish industry had an 
international profile and reputation and the Irish state ramped up its support efforts for the 
industry and new high potential start-ups in particular. An indigenous venture capital 
industry was seeded and elements of a private sector support ecosystem of specialist 
business service firms was starting to form. 
This chronological account leads to some important findings that accord with some of the 
recent literature on cluster evolution (e.g. Bresnahan et al. 2001; Harrison et al. 2004; 
Feldman 2005; Mason 2008): 
 Entrepreneurial agency seems to have played a crucial role in the evolution of the 
cluster and in ‗inducing‘ and driving the emergence of a more supportive regional 
entrepreneurial environment; 
 Neither the supportive regional environment of the 1990s, nor the policies and actions 
of the Irish State, were significant factors in the cluster‘s emergence, since these 
developments came after at least two entrepreneurial generations. 
 The story of the cluster‘s emergence and evolution appears to fit well with ‗co-
evolutionary‘ perspectives, since entrepreneurial activities both influenced and were 
influenced by the wider entrepreneurial environment in a ‗dialectic‘ fashion. 
 
Profile of the eight born global software firms 
A key focus of this paper, albeit within a wider narrative of cluster evolution, is the born 
global phenomenon and new venture internationalisation. Eight Irish born global software 
firms were investigated as part of the goal of exploring and exposing the relationship between 
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new venture internationalisation and the cluster life cycle (Table 3). The eight firms selected 
were all founded in Ireland (seven in Greater Dublin; one in Galway) between January 1997 
and March 2000, in what has been characterised here as Stage III, the accelerated 
growth/established cluster phase. They were all part of the Sterne‘s (2004) 4th generation of 
Irish software firms. All eight firms were founded by teams rather than individuals, with a 
minimum of two and a maximum of seven founders. In all cases, the founding team had 
significant prior experience; two firms were founded by habitual (serial) entrepreneurs, three 
were entrepreneurial spin-offs from incumbent firms, and three were bone fide new entrants 
but had very experienced founding teams; there were no university spin-outs (Table 3). All 
eight firms were niche software product companies, focusing on technological niches such as 
‗middleware‘ and software integration (Cape Clear, Macalla, Xiam) and/or applications for 
specific vertical markets such as telecommunications (Am Beo, Network365, Openet, Xiam) 
or banking and financial services (CR2, Macalla, Norkom). All firms were highly innovative - 
frequently releasing new and upgraded products - and most received had international 
recognition via industry awards. And all eight firms received multiple rounds of venture 
capital funding; for example, they raised a total of €114 million in 18 separate deals, ranging 
from €1.9-15 million in value, between January 1999 and August 2003. Finally, although no 
consistent series of employment and turnover data was available for the eight firms, 
secondary data sources suggest that three grew to employ over 200 staff (CR2, Norkom, 
Openet) and the remainder reached 30-100 employees; several had annual turnovers in the 
range €10-50 million. Hence, although these firms remained SMEs by commonly accepted 
definitions, some were quite large for independent software product companies.  
 
The eight firms had the following characteristics that indicated they could reasonably be 
labelled ‗true born globals‘ (Kuivalainen et al. 2007):  
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 All were highly export-oriented (i.e. international intensity), indeed some appeared to 
have no domestic customers (Am Beo, CR2, Openet). 
 Each firm had secured a number of key contracts with major corporate customers in at 
least two (and typically more) major continental markets (i.e. bi- or multi-regional 
internationalisation) - most firms had customers in the rest of Europe and North America 
but mobile telecoms software firms Network 365 and Xiam had key early customers in 
Asian markets, which were enthusiastic early adopters of 3G mobile technology, and 
banking software firm CR2 had numerous customers in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, 
Africa and Asia;  
 All firms had engaged in some types of foreign direct investment activity (i.e. multi-
modal internationalisation). All eight had established overseas offices within their first 
three-to-five years. Typically these were sales and marketing operations but some firms 
had also opened offshore development centres in (cheaper and more skill abundant) 
locations such as India, Sri Lanka and Hungary. In addition, three firms acquired or 
merged with firms outside Ireland; Cape Clear bought UK firm Orbware in 2000, CR2 
bought London-based Interlink in the same year, and Network365 acquired California-
based iPIN to form Valista in 2003.  
 All eight firms had formed international strategic alliances and partnerships in their early 
years, either to develop their international market penetration (channel partners, 
distributors) or to access technological resources (technology partners). In addition, 
several of the firms participated in global communities of interest, such as industry 
standards bodies.  
 Finally, these firms appeared to make regular use of international trade fairs (e.g. World 
GSM Congress and CommunicAsia in the case of firms operating the mobile telecoms 
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market) to launch and promote products and to network with key global industry players 
and stay apprised of key trends and emerging technologies. 
 
New venture creation, internationalisation and the regional entrepreneurial environment in the 
embryonic Irish software cluster 
 
New venture origins and internationalisation 
This section seeks to provide a historical reference point for the subsequent discussion of the 
eight born global cases from the accelerated growth/established phase of the Irish software 
cluster. It examines new venture creation and internationalisation during the earlier 
embryonic/emerging cluster stages, and also provides some insights on the nature of the 
entrepreneurial environment in this earlier period in the cluster life cycle.  
 
First, looking at the origins of the early Irish software product firms, it becomes clear that 
there was no single source of knowledge which was being exploited. Rather, the emergence of 
these firms can be attributed to the entrepreneurial efforts of a small group of pioneers who 
sought to capitalise on their own particular expertise - gleaned from their varied work 
experience in industry, academia and the public sector – and the commercial opportunity 
presented by the emerging market for software products. Thus, according to Ó Riain (1997), 
early Irish software product firms emerged by three main routes: 
 
1. Services to products route - Many indigenous software product companies began by 
providing ‗bespoke‘ or custom services to businesses, then expanded this business into 
making consultancy kits and subsequently into products, gradually expanding into export 
markets. Early customers within Ireland - who commissioned various IT development 
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projects - are said to have provided an important catalyst. Among these customers were MNC 
subsidiaries in various industries and it has been argued that Ireland‘s general success in 
attracting FDI was important in creating additional local demand for fledgling software firms 
(O‘Gorman et al, 1997).  
 
2. Spin-outs from larger firms - Some early indigenous software firms were created when 
firms in other industries, such as telecommunications or computer hardware, spun off their 
software divisions. Other firms emerged from divisions of MNCs, semi-state bodies and Irish 
firm). Ó Riain (1997, p.30) argues the key dynamic in this process was local in that ―domestic 
managers created new competencies and business for their divisions and convinced the 
management of the parent company to support their projects‖. A further type of spin out 
occurred when users of software - in vertical markets such as banking and training – applied 
their detailed knowledge of these markets to open up opportunities for new software 
businesses. 
 
3. Firms based on academic research - Whilst the university spin-off/start-up route was 
probably not the most numerically significant this should not hide the fact that some of the 
most successful indigenous software companies originated from a university environment 
(e.g. Iona Technologies, Baltimore Technologies, Trintech) being set up by professors and 
graduate students based on their on-campus research (Ó Riain, 1997, p.30). These were 
among the most technically-sophisticated and fastest-growing firms in the indigenous 
industry, operating in areas such as development tools, system software, computer-based 
training and telecommunications (Arora et al, 2001, p.8). 
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If we look specifically at some of the leading firms founded in the emerging cluster stage (see 
also Table 4), this also reveals that these firms emerged from a variety of sources. CBT 
Systems (later SmartForce then SkillSoft), the e-learning/computer-based training specialist 
and Ireland‘s first Nasdaq IPO, is said to have emerged on the back of an Irish government-
led ‗courseware‘ initiative in the mid-1980s (Ó Riain, 1999; HotOrigin Ltd, 2002). Datalex, a 
provider of IT solutions to the airline and travel industry, was established when the in-house 
IT development team at Aer Lingus spun-off in 1985 (HotOrigin Ltd, 2002). Parthus (later 
ParthusCeva), which develops software for semiconductor design, was established in 1993 
when Digital Equipment Corporation closed its Irish R&D operations and the core 
development team stayed together to form a new company (HotOrigin Ltd, 2002). Iona 
Technologies, the second Irish Nasdaq IPO, was founded in 1991 on the back of research at 
Trinity College Dublin on distributed computing. Baltimore and Trintech also have their 
origins in academic research. Euristix, which was acquired by Fore Systems of the USA in 
1999 for US$80 million, was founded by Dr Jim Mountjoy who had a background in 
academia and the public sector and had been MD of Baltimore in the late 1980s. The founders 
of Kindle Banking Systems – sold to Misys of the UK in 1995 - came from a background in 
the banking industry. 
 
The precise internationalisation behaviour and paths of these early software product firms are 
hard to uncover from secondary research. However, the available evidence tends to suggest 
that they generally internationalised gradually, having initially focused on providing custom 
services to domestic customers, or, where they did begin internationalising early in their life 
(due to a small or non-existent home market for their products) they progressed at a slow pace 
and/or had a narrow geographical scope, typically focusing on the culturally-proximate UK or 
US markets. Thus, Sterne (2004, p.65) states ―the typical generation two company [founded 
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in the early-to-mid 1980s] started as a service provider to local customers, wrote its first code 
as a sideline, re-positioned itself as a product developer after a few years‖ and generation 
three firms [mostly founded in the late 1980s/early 1990s] were ―characterised by product 
specialisation, more frequent forays into America‖. Kindle Banking Systems – which wrote 
software for ICL minicomputers - first exported to the UK market and subsequently 
internationalised to former British colonies around the world, based on the ICL connection. 
Overall, there seem to be similarities with the traditional Uppsala or stage models of 
internationalisation, and where firms were early internationalisers, their exporting generally 
progressed quite slowly and with a narrow market scope. 
 
The regional entrepreneurial environment for early software firms 
To expose the nature of the regional entrepreneurial environment facing new software 
ventures in Stage II of the cluster (i.e. late 1980s/early 1990s), I review the experience of Iona 
Technologies, which became arguably the most successful Irish indigenous software firm of 
the 1990s
8
. The Iona story serves to highlight the difficulties faced by Irish software 
companies who were founded in Stage II of the cluster life cycle. The environment was 
characterised by a weak domestic capital market; a lack of experienced entrepreneurs, 
managers and sales personnel in Ireland; an absence of specialised supporting business 
services firms; and a lack of understanding of the requirements of technology start-ups in the 
State development agencies. In addition, there was also no real precedent of an Irish software 
firm ‗breaking‘ the US market. In the late 1980s the first generation of Irish software firms 
had either failed commercially (e.g. Generics) or been swallowed up and run-down by foreign 
multinationals (e.g. Glockenspiel, Software Labs, RTS, Intelligence Ireland, COPS and 
Workhorse) (O‘Riain, 1999). Several other promising Irish software firms were then acquired 
by foreign multinationals during the late 1980s and early 1990s and continued to operate as 
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subsidiaries of their new parent companies (e.g. Insight, Kindle, Quay and Credo) (O‘Riain, 
1999). 
 
Iona was founded in 1991 and underwent an IPO on the Nasdaq stock exchange in 1997. 
Hence the key phase of Iona‘s development falls within Stage II of the cluster life cycle 
(Table 2). Iona Technologies had its joint headquarters in Dublin, Ireland and Waltham, MA 
(near Boston). In 2000, it had revenues of US$153 million (69% from product licences, 31% 
from services), over 4,500 customers and partners (including numerous Blue Chip clients), 
and over 900 employees in 30 offices worldwide (including sales force of 300+). Iona‘s core 
product offering was a web services platform for total business integration (Orbix End 2 
Anywhere™). This built on the original core product of the company, which was based on the 
CORBA industry standard for open systems-based middleware (Iona was influential within 
the Object Management Group industry standards body that founded CORBA). 
 
Between 1985 and 1991, Trinity College Dublin‘s Department of Computer Science was 
engaged in leading edge research on distributed computing (funded by the EU Esprit 
programme). Iona CEO Dr Chris Horn was one of the original researchers on this programme. 
In 1991, the EU funding was drawing to a close and the researchers were keen to see the 
technology commercialised. TCD had an active ‗campus company scheme‘ and offered the 
academic researchers a three year window of opportunity to build a company and 
commercialise the technology. The academics were offered a reduced teaching load and 
incubation space by TCD, with the opportunity to either resign their faculty positions or stay 
on at TCD at the end of the three years. Hence Iona was founded in March 1991 by Chris 
Horn, along with colleagues Dr Sean Baker and Annrai O‘Toole, in a 200 sq ft office in the 
TCD Innovation Centre. 
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At the outset, the Iona founders had very little capital, little commercial experience, and - as 
Horn later admitted - a business plan which was not credible. In terms of external financing 
options for Iona, Irish private investors were wary of indigenous technology firms after a 
number of high-profile failures in the 1980s; there were no local venture capitalists in Ireland; 
the major banks would not lend to software firms who had no tangible assets against which to 
secure a loan; and the Industrial Development Authority was showing only limited interest. 
Iona then tried, without success, to secure VC from 3i in the UK and some French funds. 
Finally, Iona found interest from Atlantic Partners in Boston but they wanted Iona to relocate 
to the United States, a suggestion which was strongly resisted by the founders. Faced with this 
harsh funding environment, Iona was forced to adopt a ‗bootstrapping‘ strategy (i.e. selling 
consultancy and training services to generate funds). By mid-1992 Iona was able to hire two 
full-time employees and by mid-1993 its first product was ready for commercial sale. Iona 
secured its first customer at a trade show in San Francisco that year but more significantly it 
met with executives of Sun Microsystems, who became interested in Iona‘s product. Sun 
bought a 25% stake in Iona for US$600,000 and took two board seats, in December 1993. 
There was also an OEM agreement whereby Sun incorporated Iona‘s middleware software on 
their Workstations. Sun‘s name was also useful as a ‗badge of credibility‘ for Iona, especially 
in the tough US market. Note that Iona was export-oriented from the outset because the Irish 
domestic market for its software was almost non-existent. Ireland‘s Industrial Development 
Authority became interested around this time and made a significant investment in Iona. 
Motorola and Boeing were the first Blue Chip customers. In 1996, Sun offered to buy the 
remaining 75% of Iona for US$45 million but Iona said no. Iona aspired to an IPO but this 
was blocked by Sun‘s board members. Eventually Iona was ‗set free‘ by Sun, who sold their 
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25% stake for US$60 million in 1997. Iona‘s 1997 IPO on Nasdaq was the fourth largest ever, 
valuing the company at US$240 million (revenues at this time were only US$16 million). 
 
The fact that Iona was able to overcome this difficult environment can be attributed to its 
excellent technology, which coincided with a surge in demand driven by the Internet and the 
widespread adoption of network computing; to the excellent leadership of CEO Chris Horn 
(which is widely acknowledged in the industry); to a degree of learning from the commercial 
shortcomings of earlier Irish firms like Glockenspiel; and to some novel strategies for 
developing the company (e.g. bootstrapping, OEM agreement with Sun, membership of 
Object Management Group standards body). However, Iona succeeded in spite of, not 
because of, the regional entrepreneurial environment in Ireland during Stage II, and many 
other start-ups from this era were not so capable or fortunate. 
 
The emergence of ‗true born global‘ firms in the accelerated growth/established phase of the 
Irish software cluster 
 
A transformed entrepreneurial environment in Stage III 
In this section, I seek to highlight some important contrasts between the environment for new 
venture creation and internationalisation in Stage III (late 1990s), as compared with the early 
Stage II in the life cycle (Table 2). My central argument is that the regional entrepreneurial 
environment was substantially improved by Stage II, as a result a gradual process of co-
evolution driven by the earlier entrepreneurial efforts by pioneering Generation 1, 2 and 3 
firms (summarised in Table 2). This transformed regional environment provided many useful 
resources and supports for new venture creation and internationalisation. Three key changes 
in the regional entrepreneurial environment were as follows: 
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1. Institution building and improved government support – One significant distinction from 
Stages I and II of the life cycle was the development of a set of specialised supporting 
institutions. Institutions such as the National Software Directorate (an agency charged 
with the co-ordination of government policy towards the software industry), Irish 
Software Association (an industry association involving many of the leading foreign and 
indigenous firms), Irish Internet Association and Centre for Software Engineering (a 
technology transfer centre and centre of excellence based at Dublin City University) were 
all founded in the early 1990s in response the emergence of the early industry pioneers. 
These institutions facilitated knowledge dissemination and learning with the cluster 
through their various seminars, industry studies, strategy reports, networking events, etc. 
Of particular importance to the development of effective institutions was the close inter-
relationship with industry: the first leader of the NSD (Barry Murphy) and head of the 
CSE (Robert Cochran) were both experienced industry insiders whose personal career 
histories traversed the private and public sectors. 
 
Another effect of the emergence of a critical mass of companies during Stage II was 
increased attention and support from the State development agencies. Notably Enterprise 
Ireland, formed in 1997 from an institutional re-shuffle, was quick to realize the 
indigenous development potential of the software industry and offered a range of hard and 
soft supports to emerging software firms during the late 1990s/early 2000s. Among this 
support was assistance with internationalisation, including the provision of overseas office 
space and support in the United States. Sterne (2003) observed that ―the state agency 
structure has shown an admirable flexibility over the years. It has never really instigated 
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anything new. But it has been a good 'fast follower' and reacted quickly to emerging 
problems among the client firms‖. 
 
2. Development of a thick labour market - By Stage III, Ireland had developed a thick 
technical labour market in software-related (technical, sales and managerial) skills, 
particularly in the Greater Dublin region. The prolific output of computing graduates from 
the third-level education institutions (universities and especially Institutes of Technology) 
since the mid-1980s – which was ramped up significantly during the 1990s in response to 
the cluster‘s emergence - was supplemented by over decade of on-the-job learning within 
both the overseas and indigenous software sectors, and related sectors, and by heavy 
investment in employee training (O‘Gorman et al, 1997). Another notable phenomenon 
during Stage III was the involvement of experienced ‗cluster pioneers‘ as non-executive 
directors (NEDs) on the boards of young software firms. For example, in the early 2000s, 
high-profile cluster pioneers like Dr Chris Horn (IONA co-founder and CEO) and Dr Jim 
Mountjoy (Baltimore and Euristix founder) had NED role with numerous young 
indigenous technology firms. The key point here is that there was no equivalent pool of 
experienced entrepreneurs and managers available to start-up companies in Stages 1 and 2 
of the cluster life cycle.  
 
3. Development of a local venture capital industry (and other specialised support firms) – A 
very significant development in Stage III was the emergence of a local venture capital 
industry, and the increasing involvement of international VC investors. As Ó Riain (2000, 
p.32) notes, it was only in 1998/99 that private investment capital became abundant in 
Irish software. The Irish VC industry was ‗kick-started‘ by an EU-funded Irish 
government programme, which matched public and private funds with the aim of 
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stimulating investment in promising technology-based start-ups (Enterprise Ireland 2000). 
Thus, between 1998 until the early/mid 2000s, venture capital became the dominant 
source of external finance for ‗build-phase‘ indigenous software companies and was said 
to be in abundant supply for good business propositions (HotOrigin Ltd, 2001 and 2002). 
The significance of VC is two-fold. First, VC provides the fuel for new venture growth 
and internationalisation. Second, and perhaps equally importantly, VCs play an important 
‗coaching‘ role through their involvement with young start-up companies (Hellman, 2000; 
Fernhaber and McDougall-Covin 2009). Specifically, VCs are believed to 
‗professionalise‘ the start-ups they invest in by recruiting experienced executives, 
introducing incentives such as stock options, etc (Hellman and Puri 2002). There is also 
some evidence that a habitat of supporting business service firms was beginning to form 
by Stage II – e.g. consultancies, lawyers, recruitment specialists and PR firms (see Box 1).  
 
Origins and internationalisation of born global firms in Stage III 
 
The eight born global software firms investigated for this study, which were all founded 
between 1997 and 2000 in Stage III of the cluster life cycle, were introduced previously. As 
noted earlier, the internationalisation of these firms was early, rapid, ‗aggressive‘, multi-
modal and focused on multiple global market regions; these were ‗true born global‘ firms. It 
is argued here that the origins and antecedents of these international new ventures are an 
important factor in this internationalisation behaviour. Table 5 provides a brief summary of 
the origins and antecedents of the eight firms. This evidence shows that all of the firms had 
experienced founding teams. Three of the firms (AmBeo, Cape Clear and Macalla) originated 
as spin-offs from successful indigenous firms (Saville, Iona and Quay), and inherited 
significant resources from their ‗parent‘ firms. Two of the firms were second entrepreneurial 
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ventures for their founding teams (CR2 and Network365). Again, the previous experience of 
these founders was an important learning experience and source of inherited resources for the 
new ventures (Table 5). CR2 co-founder Cian Kinsella, who was previously a co-founder of 
successful Irish banking software firm Kindle, said in an interview in September 2000: 
"Experience makes it easier. Second time round we have got the real experience of being in 
the software business and understanding software. Ron has more of a sales leaning. I have 
more of a products leaning and we are a good combination" (Linnane 2000; cross-refer Table 
5). Even, the apparent ‗new entrants‘ in the cohort (Norkom, Openet and Xiam) had very 
experienced founding teams with important embodied resources, such as deep knowledge of 
particular vertical markets that were being targeted by the new venture.  Two important points 
to note here are therefore are: (1) the vastly superior resources and capabilities at inception of 
the eight born global firms, by comparison with firms founded in earlier stages of the cluster 
life cycle, due to the extensive prior experiences of their founding team members; and (2) the 
fact that this prior experience was mainly acquired working for earlier generations of Irish 
software firms during earlier phases of the cluster life cycle (notably Stage II).  
 
Another key factor in the internationalisation of the studied born globals, it is argued, is the 
ability of these firms to access necessary additional resources for internationalisation from 
within their (external) home regional environment. As discussed in the preceding section, the 
regional entrepreneurial environment was significantly improved by Stage III. In particular, 
some of the resources that are known to be useful for early and rapid internationalisation (e.g. 
venture capital, experienced executives and supportive institutions) were relatively abundant 
by Stage IIII. The superior inherited resource profile of the firms at start-up (embodied in 
their experienced founding teams) is meant these firms were particularly well-placed to 
capitalise on the increasingly ‗munificent‘ entrepreneurial environment in Ireland in the late 
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1990s/early 2000s, and to exploit emerging niche opportunities in global software markets. In 
the case of venture capital, for example, the studied born globals were all able to attract 
multiple rounds of funding to facilitate their rapid international expansion (Table 6). For 
example, CR2 was able to double its size in June 2000 with the £8.1m acquisition of London-
based Interlink a global provider of banking channel software for ATM and point of sale 
devices. Interlink was active in India, Africa, the Middle East and Asia Pacific Rim with 90 
customers in over 70 countries; thus CR2 was able to accelerate its global expansion plans 
with a ready-made international infrastructure‖ (Linnane 2000). This accelerated growth path 
would not have been available without VC investment (from ACT and Enterprise Ireland in 
1999 then GIMV in April 2000), access to which relied heavily on the founders‘ prior track 
record at Kindle. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The paper has sought to contribute to the burgeoning literature on small firm 
internationalisation and International Entrepreneurship, notably on the topic of ‗born global‘ 
firms or international new ventures. In particular, the paper has explored the relationship 
between new venture creation and internationalisation and the cluster life cycle, and sought to 
illustrate the potential ‗added value‘ that might be brought to the study of IB/IE topics by 
adopting an interdisciplinary perspective. A second disciplinary perspective can be seen as an 
alternative ‗lens‘ though which to view a phenomenon or problem. In the specific case 
examined in this paper, insights from the cluster literature (in economic geography, regional 
studies and industrial dynamics) were shown to have the potential to shed new light on the 
question of what influences the emergence and internationalisation of new ventures.  
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In the Irish experience, the emergence of ‗truly born global‘ software firms during the 
expansionary/accelerated growth phase (Stage III) of the cluster life cycle appears to owe 
much to the transformed nature of the regional entrepreneurial environment that existed in 
Ireland by that period
9
. In this enhanced ‗habitat‘ – produced by the co-evolution of 
entrepreneurial agency and the regional environment over a period of two decades - resources 
suitable for (early and rapid) internationalisation (such as venture capital, policy support and 
experienced executives) were more abundant. These resources could be appropriated and 
exploited by new software ventures, especially those with experienced founders. 
Significantly, the entrepreneurial generation that founded the leading new software firms of 
the late 1990s differed from earlier entrepreneurial generations as they were able to draw 
upon substantial prior experience and accumulated knowledge and expertise. These prior 
experiences were highly geographically situated (i.e. largely in Ireland, working for Irish 
firms, including those active in international markets) and were intimately bound up with the 
emergence of the Irish software cluster; i.e. key embodied resources and capabilities for early 
internationalisation had been ‗forged‘ in earlier phases in the cluster life cycle. This all 
suggests that a more holistic understanding of the born global/INV phenomenon could be 
developed by paying closer attention to the geographical and historical context with which 
such firms emerge. Future studies might wish to give greater consideration to these contextual 
factors, which are often ‗swept under the carpet‘ due to the disciplinary pre-occupation in 
business and management studies with entrepreneur- and firm-level units of analysis. 
 
This paper faces limitations that are inherent in all case study research, notably the issue of 
external validity (generalisability) – i.e. are the findings here specific to the Irish software 
case or common to other emergent technology clusters (e.g. Israeli, Finnish and Bangalore 
software/IT clusters). Whilst it is impossible to answer this question with confidence, there do 
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appear to be some parallels with the Israeli (Teubal et al. 2002; DeFontenay and Carmel 2004; 
Avnimelech and Teubal 2006). However, the focus on a single case, with its very specific 
context, means caution must be exercised in seeking to generalise the findings. Despite these 
concerns, Yin‘s (2003) assertion that case study research is concerned with generalisation to 
theory rather than populations suggests the links between new venture internationalisation and 
stages in the cluster life cycle may well merit further consideration in attempts to theorise 
international entrepreneurship and the born global phenomenon.  
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Figure 1: Total Domestic and Export Revenue of Ireland’s Indigenous Software 
Industry, 1991-2003 (€m) 
 
 
 
Source: author‘s presentation of data from National Software Directorate, Enterprise Ireland. 
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Table 1: Stylised comparison of research on early internationalizing firms and on clusters. 
 
 Born globals/international new ventures research stream Clusters research stream 
Dominant 
disciplinary 
background 
Business and management studies sub-disciplines: 
 (International) entrepreneurship 
 International business 
 International marketing 
 Economic geography 
 Regional studies/regional science 
 Applied and regional economics 
 [Also: Industrial dynamics] 
Primary unit of 
analysis 
 Firm 
 Entrepreneur(s)/owner-manager(s) 
 Cluster/agglomeration 
 Region/locality 
Examples of key 
research 
themes/questions  
 Gradual internationalisations versus BGs/INVs 
 Origins and antecedents of BGs/INVs 
 Strategies pursued by BGs/INVs (or entrepreneurs) 
 Search for new or appropriate theory 
 Reasons for existence of clusters/agglomerations 
 Nature and sources of regional industry competitiveness 
 Advantages conferred on firms located within clusters 
 Origins, evolution and sustainability of clusters 
Typical research 
strategies and 
methods 
 Primary: positivist tradition; multivariate analysis of 
quantitative datasets from large-scale surveys or 
constructed from public or private data sources 
 Secondary: interpretive tradition; multiple case studies; 
corporate interviews; qualitative data 
 Primary (esp. in economic geography and regional studies): in-depth 
case studies (often single, sometimes multiple); corporate interviews, 
surveys, histories, genealogies, secondary data analysis; primarily 
cross-sectional but sometimes longitudinal 
 Also some studies in quantitative/positivist tradition, especially in 
regional science and applied/regional economics 
Theoretical 
approaches  
 (Challenge to) traditional process internationalization 
theory (e.g. Uppsala model, stage models) 
 International new ventures (Ovaitt & McDougall, 1994) 
 Network perspective 
 Resource-based view 
 Knowledge-based view  
 
 Marshallian agglomeration economies 
 Institutional perspectives, including: regional innovation systems, 
innovative milieu (GREMI group) 
 Porterian diamond of competitive advantage 
 ‗New Economic Geography‘ (Paul Krugman, etc.) 
 Evolutionary approaches 
 
 
Source: author‘s interpretation. 
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Table 2: Key Developments in Ireland’s Indigenous Software Industry in Four Stages 
 
 Key industry characteristics and 
developments 
Key developments in cluster ‗habitat‘ 
Stage I:  
Pre-/Proto-cluster 
(1970s to late 
1980s) 
• Small population of firms 
• Pioneering 1st generation firms 
focused on services and custom 
development for mainframes 
• Some high profile failures and asset-
stripping foreign acquisitions 
• Small number of 2nd generation firms 
that were innovative but lacked 
commercial experience/expertise 
(e.g. Glockenspiel, Generics) 
• ‗Accidental‘ creation of pre-conditions 
for indigenous growth 
• Third-level education reforms: university 
expansion plus establishment of Regional 
Technology Colleges (now known as 
Institutes of Technology) 
• Upgrading of telecoms infrastructure 
with EU funds 
• IDA Ireland attracts FDI by leading ICT 
hardware and software multinationals 
Stage II:  
Embryonic/ 
emerging cluster  
(late 1980s to mid 
1990s) 
• Beginnings of critical mass? 
• 2nd generation firms exporting 
software products to UK and beyond 
• Emergence of 3rd generation firms, 
including future IPO and acquisition 
exits of Stage III 
• Move towards niche software 
product based business model 
• Recognised technical communities in 
middleware, courseware and 
telecommunications software 
• State agencies slowly begin to recognise 
potential of indigenous software industry 
• Industry-specific institutions formed (e.g. 
National Software Directorate, Centre for 
Software Engineering, Irish Software 
Association) 
• Some internationally significant 
development work done by indigenous 
firms (e.g. Aldiscon, Iona) 
Stage III: 
Expansionary/ 
accelerated growth  
(mid 1990s to 
2001/02) 
• Critical mass attained? 
• IPOs and acquisition exits of leading 
3
rd
 generation firms (e.g. Aldiscon, 
Baltimore, CBT Systems, Euristix, 
Kindle, Iona, Trintech,) 
• Internationalisation of many 
indigenous firms and growing export 
intensity of industry 
• Emergence of ‗true born globals‘ 
among 4
th
 Generation firms 
• Some examples of outward FDI 
• Increasing volume of start-ups, incl. 
spin-offs from incumbents 
• International recognition of leading Irish 
software firms and the developing cluster 
of significant capability 
• State development agency Enterprise 
Ireland (established in 1997) develops 
strong focus on indigenous software 
firms, provides hard and soft supports 
• Establishment of local venture capital 
industry (as well as abundant angel 
investment) plus inflow of foreign VC  
• Establishment/attraction of private 
‗Economy Two‘ support firms as part of 
developing start-up ‗habitat‘ 
Stage IV: 
External shock, 
rationalisation and 
reinvention 
(2002 onwards) 
• External shock: dot.com crash and 
global technology sector downturn 
• De-listing of several key players 
• Rationalisation and cost-cutting plus 
a limited number of high-profile firm 
‗failures‘ followed by gradual return 
to growth by about 2004 
• Harsher investment climate/funding crisis 
• Doubts about scale of firms and 
sustainability/‗adaptability‘ of cluster  
• Enterprise Ireland broadens focus to 
other indigenous industry sectors  
• Some software institutions disbanded or 
downgraded (e.g. CSE, NSD) 
 
Source: author, based on own secondary research and reading of existing studies (O‘Gorman et al. 1997; Ó 
Riain, 1999 and 2004; O‘Malley and O‘Gorman 2001; Sterne, 2004; Sands 2005; Roche et al. 2008). 
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Table 3: Profile of eight ‘born global’ Irish software firms  
 
Company 
(Date est.) 
Business niche 
(c.2003) Locations (c.2003) Example customers (c.2003) 
Known customers by region 
Status as of October 2009 IR EU NA AP RW 
Am Beo 
(Mar 2000) 
Rating and billing 
solutions for 
telecoms  
Galway; Denver, 
Madrid, Paris 
Lycos Europe, Western 
Wireless, Sonera ZED 
X √ √ X X Acquired by Nasdaq-listed Embarcadero 
Technologies (US) in Oct 2005 for total cash 
consideration of $6.15 million 
Cape Clear 
(Aug 1999) 
Web services 
integration 
technology  
Dublin; London, 
California, 
Massachusetts 
Accenture, AT&T, BT, Credit 
Suisse, Dresdner Bank, GE, HP, 
Sky 
√ √ √ X √ Acquired by Workday (US) in March 2008 for 
undisclosed sum; had revenues over $5m but was 
loss-making at time; Dublin operation since 
expanded 
CR2 
(Jan 1997) 
Channel banking 
and card payment 
solutions  
Dublin; London, 
Dubai, Bangalore, 
Mumbai, Perth, 
Singapore, Miami 
ANZ, American Express Bank 
India, Standard Chartered, 
Rothschild, Bank Muscat, 
Barclays  
X √ √ X √ Independent (private); original founders no 
longer on board; turnover grew to over €15m and 
firm was profitable in 2008 
Macalla 
(Mar 1998) 
Mobile commerce 
platforms and 
solutions 
Dublin; Madrid, 
London, New York, 
Frankfurt  
ING/Postbank, Telfort/MMO2 
(Neth), Vodafone, Dresdner 
Kleinwort 
√ √ √ X X Acquired by Roamware (US) in Sept 2009 for 
unknown sum; had been growing and trading 
profitably; Dublin operations expected to expand 
Network365 
(Jun 1999) 
Enabling 
technology for 
mobile services 
Co Wicklow; 
Japan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, USA, 
Sri Lanka, France 
Hutchinson (HK), CSL (HK), 
Cesky Mobile, Celltel Lanka, 
O2, NTT DoCoMo (Jap) 
√ √ √ √ X Acquired by Aepona (N Ireland) in July 2009 in 
all-share deal (undisclosed value); turnover of 
€10m and 100 employees in 2007; loss-making 
but reducing losses 
Norkom 
(Mar 1998) 
eCRM solutions 
and customer 
intelligence tools 
Dublin; London, 
Brussels, Ontario, 
Boston (MA), Israel 
HSBC, Bezeq (Israel), Canadian 
Tire Fin Serv, ING Direct, HFC 
Bank, BA, Actel (Belg) 
√ √ √ X X Independent (public); underwent successful 
IPO on AIM & IEX in May 2006; Turnover of 
€48m, profits of €4.9m and MarCap over €100m 
in 2009; 210 staff (135 in Ire) in 2007 
Openet 
(Jul 1999) 
Telecom billing 
software for real-
time charging 
Dublin; London; 
Paris, Rome, Palo 
Alto (CA), Reston 
(VA), Hungary 
Orange, Telecom Italia Mobile, 
Publitel spa (Ita), TMN 
(Portugal), Verizon Wireless 
X √ √ X X Independent (private); employs 340 people 
worldwide (incl. US, UK, France, Italy, Brazil, 
Singapore), including 120 in Dublin; Turnover of 
€37m and growing in 2008. 
Xiam 
(Sep 1999) 
Mobile 
middleware and 
application 
software 
Dublin; High 
Wycombe (UK), 
Sydney, Tokyo, 
Singapore 
Vodafone, Orange, CSL (HK), 
Telenor Interactive (US), 
Midwest Wireless (US) 
√ √ √ √ X  Acquired by Qualcomm (US) in March 2008 for 
$32m; 30 staff in Dublin at time; spawned 
corporate spin-off (PolarLake, also an EIF) 
Notes: Key to market regions: IR = Ireland; EU = Rest of Europe (incl. UK); NA = North America; AP = Asia-Pacific; RW = Rest of world (e.g. Middle East, Africa, Latin America, 
Oceania); √ indicates firm was known to have customers in this region in 2003 and X indicates no evidence of customers in this region. 
Source: compiled by author using information from company websites and various secondary data sources (e.g. sector-specific online news media). 
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Table 4: Stylised comparison of leading firms founded in embryonic/emerging phase (Stage II) 
and expansionary/accelerated growth phase (Stage III) of Ireland’s indigenous software cluster 
 
Cluster stage II. Embryonic/emerging cluster III. Expansionary/accelerated growth phase 
Year founded mid 1980s-early 1990s 1996-2000 
Status Leading lights of established cluster 
Underwent IPO in mid-to-late 1990s or 
‗exited‘ via foreign multinational acquisition 
Emerging or potential future stars  
VC-funded/growth-oriented start-ups, some 
tipped as future IPO candidates 
Examples Generation 2 survivors: Baltimore 
Technologies Kindle Banking Systems; 
Generation 3 firms: Aldiscon, CBT Systems, 
Datalex, Euristix, Iona Technologies, Quay 
Financial Software, Saville Systems, 
Trintech 
Generation 4 firms: AmBeo, Buytel, CapeClear, 
ChangingWorlds, CR2, Eware, Macalla, 
Massana, Network365, Norkom, Openet, Qumas, 
Rococo, Sepro, Vordel, WBT Systems, Xiam 
Niches Communications software, middleware, 
computer-based training, banking and 
finance applications, security software 
Telecommunications, web services integration 
technology, mobile commerce, financial services 
applications, CRM 
Venture origins Majority were spin-outs/offs from non-
software firms, also some university spin-
outs 
Entrepreneurial spin-offs from incumbent 
software firms.; serial software entrepreneurs; 
new entrants with experienced founding teams; 
only a few university spin-outs 
Founder 
characteristics 
• Pioneers 
• Technologists as CEOs 
• Mainly first-timer entrepreneurs 
• Limited commercial know-how 
• Mainly experienced (e.g. prior 
entrepreneurial, senior managerial, vertical 
market and overseas work experience) 
• Teams of multiple founders with 
complementary expertise 
• Professionalization of executive team 
Firm-building 
strategies 
• ‗Bootstrapping‘ (selling services to fund 
product development) 
• Custom development services and niche 
product development 
• Increasingly export-focused 
• Some gradual internationalisers and 
some born internationals? 
• Mainly targeted (culturally proximate) 
UK and US markets? 
• Mainly Venture capital financed 
• Niche product-focused from outset 
• Multi-modal internationalisation, including 
acquisitions and extensive use of alliances 
and partnerships 
• Broader international market scope (with 
market attractiveness being more important 
than cultural proximity?) 
• Several ‗true born globals‘ 
 
Source: author, based on own secondary research and reading of existing studies (O‘Gorman et al. 1997; Ó Riain, 1999 
and 2004; Sterne, 2004). 
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Table 5: Antecedents and new venture origin for eight ‘born global’ Irish software firms founded in Stage III of cluster 
 
Company  Origin type Summary of antecedents/new venture origin Inherited resources and capabilities at start-up 
Am Beo Entrepreneurial 
spin-off from 
incumbent firm 
Am Beo was established in March 2000. There were seven original founders, of 
which four came directly from Saville Systems [an Irish telecommunications 
software company specialising in customer care and billing, which was taken 
over by ADC Systems] and all had a strong technical and applications 
background in data and voice billing (Source: TIU CEO Interview, April 2002). 
Founders and TMT also said to include several former Ericsson employees.  
 Extensive knowledge of vertical market niche 
(telecoms sector) and key corporate customers 
 Specialised technical expertise  
 Experience of senior managerial roles 
  
Cape Clear  Entrepreneurial 
spin-off from 
incumbent firm 
Founded by three former executives of leading Irish middleware firm Iona 
Technologies, which once employed 800 people and became only the second 
Irish firm to float on the Nasdaq stock exchange in 1997. Cape Clear 
subsequently recruited three other key executives from Iona. Like Iona, it 
initially specialised in middleware systems built to the CORBA operating 
standard. Embodied knowledge and expertise transferred in spin-off included 
experience of developing and marketing component middleware products at 
Iona, plus experience in variety of managerial roles with this leading 
indigenous software exporter. 
 Specialised technical expertise  
 OrganisatIonal – appropriate business models 
and routines for small independent software 
firms? 
 Diverse experience of managerial roles 
 Prior knowledge of technological niche market 
and key US market 
 
CR2  Established by 
habitual (serial) 
entrepreneurs 
Cian Kinsella and Ron Downey resigned from Kindle Banking Systems to 
found CR2 in 1996. Kindle was an Irish banking software firm that they had 
previously founded and subsequently sold to UK firm Misys Plc. Kinsella 
gained extensive experience during his 17 years at Kindle, including product 
development, consultancy, customer service and sales, and had served as 
Kindle‘s Technical Director and Sales Director. Downey led Kindle into its 
first export market (UK in1994) and had established Kindle's regional offices in 
Singapore, Bahrain and Miami as its Worldwide Sales Director in the early 
1990s. CR2 appointed a number of experienced executives and NEDs from 
within the cluster, including: Brian Caulfield (serial entrepreneur and co-
founder of Peregrine, Similarity Systems, Prediction Dynamics); Dr Chris Horn 
(of Iona Technologies fame) was a NED in 2003; Kieron Nagle (former Kindle 
CEO) joined as Chairman in 2005 (an example of prior network ties?). 
 Financial capital from trade sale of previous 
business? 
 Organisational – appropriate business models and 
routines for small independent software firms? 
 Prior related entrepreneurial experience with 
Kindle 
 Experience of senior managerial roles 
 Extensive experience of international market 
development at Kindle 
 Extensive knowledge of vertical market niche 
and key corporate customers 
 
Macalla  Entrepreneurial 
spin-off from 
incumbent firm 
Founded when a team of key executives and technologists left indigenous firm 
Quay Financial Software around a year after it was taken over by Japanese 
multinational CSK. (Embodied) expertise transferred in spin-off included 
former Technical Director‘s experience of developing US market for Quay and 
 Specialised technical expertise  
 Organisational – appropriate business models and 
routines for small independent software firms? 
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technical knowledge accumulated in related work at Quay, plus managerial 
experiences in an exporting indigenous software firm. 
 Experience in various managerial roles 
 Prior knowledge of vertical and key US market 
Network365 
(later Valista) 
Established by 
habitual (serial) 
entrepreneur 
The two key founders of N365 (Raomal Perera and Denis Hennessey) 
previously co-founded ISOCOR, a US registered electronic messaging and 
Internet email server pioneer, which did its development and support work in 
Ireland, went public in 1996 and was acquired by US MNE Critical Path in 
1999. Initial capital for N365 came from key individuals in ISOCOR. N365 
targeted Asia-Pacific region (Japan & Hong Kong) and were active in 8 
countries within Asia-Pacific and Europe within first 3 years. N365 targeted the 
emerging m-commerce market. 
 Financial capital from trade sale of previous 
business? 
 Specialised technical expertise  
 Prior related entrepreneurial experiences with 
ISOCOR 
Norkom 
Technologies 
New entrant with 
experienced 
founding team 
[FILL DETAILS]   
Openet 
Telecom 
New entrant with 
experienced 
founding team 
Founders included Declan Conway and Aidan Doyle. Openet was established 
with a pre-selected, highly experienced, senior management team of software 
and telecoms industry veterans (who had worked for Euristix, Vertel, ISR 
Global Telecom and SUN). Barry Murphy - who founded and led leading Irish 
software firm Insight in 1980s (sold to Hoskyns in 1988) and was Ireland‘s first  
National Software Director from 1988-96 – was recruited as CEO at this time. 
 Extensive knowledge of vertical market niche 
(telecoms sector) 
 Diverse experience of senior managerial roles  
 Highly networked senior management team? 
 
Xiam  New entrant with 
experienced 
founding team 
The idea for Xiam was conceived together by two key founders; Warren 
Buckley) had been responsible for developing an innovative SMS system at 
Bank of Ireland Group Treasury, Robert Baker was running his Dublin-based 
ICT consulting firm and had previously worked for S3, a Dublin-based (but 
Philips-owned) firm that did custom software development work for the 
European GSM mobile telecoms standard. 
 Specialised technical expertise  
 Vertical market knowledge (mobile telecoms) 
 Prior (unrelated) entrepreneurial experience 
 
Source: compiled by author using information from company websites and various secondary data sources (e.g. sector-specific online news media). 
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Table 6: Details of venture capital investments in eight ‘born global’ Irish software firms 
(between January 1999 and August 2003) 
 
 
Date  Recipient of 
investment 
Investor(s) Value 
(€m) 
Amount  
30/03/2001 Am Beo (1
st
 round) ACT VC 3.80 IR£3M 
05/04/2002 Am Beo (1b) Enterprise Ireland 3.00   
09/05/2002 Am Beo (2
nd
 round) Advent Venture Partners and 
ACT VC 
10.00   
03/12/2002 Am Beo (2b) Advent Venture Partners and ACT VC 2.50   
14/04/2000 Cape Clear ACT VC 2.08 $2M 
01/07/2003 Cape Clear (at least 3rd) Accel VC, Greylock VC & 
ACT VC 
10.00   
07/04/2000 CR2 (1
st
) GIMV, Alpinvest and ACT VC 10.92 US$10.5M 
03/11/2000 CR2 (2
nd
) GIMV, NIB Capital and ACT VC, 
Goodbody Stockbrokers and AIB 
Corporate Banking. 
9.28 US$8M 
23/10/2001 CR2 (3rd) GIMV, NIB Capital, ACT VC 8.43 US$7.5M 
15/09/2000 Macalla The Reuters Greenhouse Fund (the venture 
capital arm of Reuters) 3i Group and 
Guinness Ulster Bank Equity Fund. 3I 
Group and Guinness Ulster Bank Equity 
8.60 €8.6M 
01/12/2000 Network365 Amadeus Capital Partners, Trinity VC 15.00 €15M  
20/06/2003 Network365 (3rd) Advent Venture Partners, Amadeus 
Capital Partners, Trinity VC, JAFCO and 
Enterprise Ireland 
10.00   
27/08/1999 Norkom 
Technologies 
(1
st
) Trinity VC 1.90 US$2M 
21/01/2000 Norkom 
Technologies 
(2
nd
) Trinity VC 2.97 $3M 
12/12/2002 Norkom 
Technologies 
Trinity VC and other shareholders (at least 
3rd rd) 
3.10   
17/03/2000 Openet Telecom XATF (Cross Atlantic Technology Fund) 3.24 £2M 
23/09/1999 XIAM Delta Venture Capital of Ireland and 
Vertex Venture Capital of Singapore 
2.54 IR£2M 
27/04/2001 XIAM (2nd rd) ADD Partners, Vertex 
Manangement, Delta Partners and 
Enterprise Ireland 
6.75 €6.75M 
  Total (€m) 114.11  
  Max 15.0  
  Min 1.9  
  Mean 6.4  
 
Note: funding rounds in US dollars converted to Euro by author using historic €/$ exchange rate data obtained from 
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html  
 
Source: author‘s searches of TechWatch.ie technology news archive in January 2002 (covering January 1999-
January 2002) and September 2003 (covering January 2002-August 2003) 
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Box 1: Examples of ‘Economy Two’ firms in Stage III of the Irish software cluster life cycle 
 
HotOrigin Ltd - Is an early-stage venture capital and specialist consultancy company. HotOrigin 
was founded in March 2000 in Dublin by an experienced team from corporate, consulting and start-
up backgrounds. Three of its founders, including its CEO David Dalton, are former consultants with 
Accenture in Dublin and its CTO was formerly Head of IBM's eBusiness Services in Ireland. 
HotOrigin‘s advisory board includes Chris Horn and Jim Mountjoy (x-refer Box 4). HotOrigin aims 
to facilitate the growth of young software companies during critical stages of development, by 
providing essential services such as management team building, business strategy development, 
technology strategy, strategic alliance partnerships and venture financing. HotOrigin has made 8 
early-stage investments in Irish tech companies over the last 18 months. 
 
InternatIonal Ventures – Provides strategic consulting services for high technology companies 
supplemented by ―tactical implementation support‖. The founders of InternatIonal Ventures are two 
high profile figures in the Irish software industry. Paul O‘Dea was a founder of banking software 
company Credo, which was acquired by Misys in 1994. He has a BE and MBA from University 
College Dublin. He has advised, invested in and mentored numerous high technology companies. 
O‘Dea is the current chairperson of the Irish Software Association and has advised the government 
on strategy for the software industry. Donal Daly is one of Ireland's most successful IT 
entrepreneurs. His first company, founded in 1986 as Expert Edge Computer Systems and later 
known as Software Development Tools Inc (SDTI), was sold to Wall Data for IEP2 million in 1997. 
Daly then formed e-marketing company NewWorld Commerce which in February of 2002 merged 
with IQ Commerce to form NewWorld IQ (Daly remains as chairman). Daly is a former chairperson 
of the ISA. 
 
Brown Rudnick Berlack Israels - The major Boston-based US law firm Brown Rudnick Berlack 
Israels opened an office in Dublin in early 2002. Brown Rudnick has annual worldwide revenue in 
excess of $100m and employs over 200 lawyers. The Dublin office advises Irish technology firms 
doing (or planning to do) business in the United States about issues such as employment legislation, 
legal disclosure, product licensing, intellectual property protection, raising venture capital and 
setting up a US office. The firm is already working with nearly 20 Irish technology companies, 
including Eurologic Systems and Fineos. 
 
Eurolink Global – This English multinatIonal firm opened a Dublin office in late 2001. Eurolink 
specialises in the supply of hard-to-find and rare skilled IT professIonals (both contract and 
permanent). Eurolink clients have instant access to a candidate bank of over 120,000 IT 
professIonals and candidates can view up to 500 assignment opportunities received on a daily basis.  
 
Simpson Financial & Technology Public Relations Ltd – Is a Dublin-based public relations 
company, founded in 1995, focusing on technology companies. Clients in the Irish software industry 
include Allfinanz, Horizon Open Systems, Norkom Technolgies and the Irish Software Association. 
Simpson FT PR aims to help companies to build corporate profile and reputation and promote their 
products and services. Founder Ronnie Simpson is a Trinity College Dublin graduate (Business 
Studies) and was previously MD of the Irish subsidiary of Edelman PR Worldwide. Simpson FT PR 
is a member of the Eurocom PR Network, a global network of technology focused PR firms with 
offices in 50 locations worldwide.  
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Notes 
1
 Interdisciplinary here refers to the use of insights from outside the broad field of business and management 
studies; in this paper this means economic geography, regional studies and related ‗spatial‘ disciplines. Several 
authors describe IE as a multi-disciplinary field but these refer to sub-fields within business and management 
such as entrepreneurship, marketing, strategic management and international business. 
2
 Conversely, it should also be noted that EIFs, or wider questions of international entrepreneurship, have so far 
received little attention in the economic geography literature (Yeung 2009). 
3
 Another notable recent theme in the more recent literature on clusters highlights the role and importance of 
international connections for dynamic clusters. Such connections, dubbed ‗global pipelines‘, are said to act as 
conduit for learning and knowledge transfer between leading global centres in particular industries and a 
complement to localised learning within clusters (Bathelt et al. 2004; Wolfe and Gertler 2004). Other studies 
have highlighted the role played by ‗diaspora networks‘ and connections to the United States in the growth of 
new technology clusters in emerging economies such as Taiwan and India (Saxenian 2007; Sonderegger and 
Täube 2010). However, the primary unit of analysis in cluster studies tends to be the cluster itself and these 
diaspora studies are more focused on internationally-mobile entrepreneurs; there has been less focus in this 
literature on the creation and internationalisation behaviour of new ventures. 
4
 Note that the overall aim in this paper to expose and examine the conceptual question [(How) is the emergence 
and internationalisation behaviour of new ventures (especially the propensity to follow a ‘born global' strategy) 
affected by the cluster life cycle context within which they are founded?] and not to understand/explain the 
existence or emergence of the Irish software cluster; several existing studies give good accounts of the cluster‘s 
emergence and evolution, or particular aspects of it (e.g. O‘Gorman et al. 1997; Ó Riain, 1999 and 2004; Sterne 
2004; Roche et al. 2008). 
5
 John Sterne is a Dublin-based journalist who has written about the information technology business in Ireland 
and internationally for more than 20 years. His 2004 book ‗Adventures in Code‘ is based on original primary 
sources, including dozens of interviews with key industry figures, and it draws on Sterne‘s extensive experience 
covering the sector as a journalist throughout the cluster life-cycle. Although the book is not an academic or 
theoretically informed account, it provides an arguably unparalleled secondary source of insights on individual 
firms and entrepreneurs, and the wider cluster. 
6
 The software industry was one of the leading sources of employment growth in Ireland‘s ‗Celtic Tiger‘ 
economy, with employment in the sector growing at a rate of 16% per annum during the 1990s (compared to 6% 
for the economy as a whole). By 2000, the Irish software industry comprised approximately 900 companies, with 
an estimated 30,000 employees and a combined annual turnover of €10 billion (NatIonal Software Directorate 
statistics cited in HotOrigin Ltd, 2002). Part of the story was a major influx of foreign direct investment in the 
sector, starting in the mid-1980s and continuing through to the present day (see Coe 1997; NSD 1997; Ó Riain 
1997; Crone 2002; Grimes 2003). The ‗overseas‘ segment of the Irish software industry included many of the 
world‘s leading software multinationals (e.g. Microsoft, Oracle, IBM/Lotus, Symantec, Sun Microsystems). 
7
 The NatIonal Software Directorate, within Enterprise Ireland, provides the best series of statistics on the Irish 
software industry (covering employment, the number of companies, revenue and exports - disaggregated into 
indigenous and overseas segments). NSD began collecting this data in 1991 due to shortcomings in existing 
official statistics (e.g. various segments of the software industry being reported in different categories with the 
NACE industrial classification system). 
8
 This section draws heavily on Horn (2002) and O‘Riain (1999), as well as O‘Neill (2001). 
9
 Analysis in this paper has focused on Stages II & III of the Irish software cluster. A question of further interest, 
but beyond the scope of the present paper, is what happened to new venture internationalisation during the 
difficult Stage IV period (after the global technology downturn of 2001-02). For example, how did the cluster 
habitat change during this period and did this have implications for the internationalisation behaviour of new 
ventures? Did a more cautious and reticent VC industry result in a change in the business models of indigenous 
companies (including new ventures) and a more cautious approach to international expansion? Further research 
is required on these questions. 
